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Consider a situation in which a principal commits to a mechanism ﬁrst and
then agents choose unobservable actions before their payoﬀ-relevant types are
realized. The agents’ actions may aﬀect not only their payoﬀsd i r e c t l yb u t
also the distribution of their types as well. This paper extends Crémer and
McLean’s full surplus extraction theorem to such a setting. In this environ-
ment, it is shown that a principal may not succeed in extracting full surplus
from agents when there are many actions to which the agents can deviate.
However, it is also shown that a principal can extract full surplus generically
given any approximately eﬃcient (completely) mixed action proﬁle. This is
achieved by using a general mechanism where agents announce both their types
and their realized actions. Therefore, with hidden actions, there is a big gap
between exact full surplus extraction and approximate full surplus extraction.
JEL classiﬁcation: C72, D44, D82
Keywords: auction, information acquisition, full surplus extraction, hid-
den action, mechanism design, mixed strategy, moral hazard, private strategy,
virtual implementation.1 Introduction
The theory of mechanism design provides a powerful tool to analyze a variety
of situations of which asymmetric information is an important aspect. One of
the standard assumptions behind this theory is that distributions of private
characteristics or types are exogenous. However, this assumption is not always
the most reasonable one. There are many situations where the distribution of
private types is endogenous rather than exogenous. For example, consider a
procurement auction where the potential bidders invest their resources before
deciding whether to participate in the auction or not. The bidders may make
such investments for a variety of reasons. They may be uncertain about the
cost of the project, thus try to come up with a better estimate of it. Or
they may spend money for R & D to reduce their costs. In either case, the
distribution of private types is endogenous.
Then questions arise naturally; do the standard results with exogenous
types generalize to the case with endogenous types? If not, how do they need
to be modiﬁed? The goal of this paper is to understand when full surplus
extaction (FSE hereafter) becomes more diﬃcult (or easier) to obtain with
endogenous types.
Crémer and McLean [13](CM hereafter) is the seminal paper on FSE. It
identiﬁes the necessary and suﬃcient condition for FSE for the standard pri-
vate value auction. Roughly saying, an auctioneer can extract full surplus from
bidders when their types are “correlated”. This condition is so weak that it
is satisﬁed for almost all information structure with ﬁnite type spaces.1 The
independent value case, which is most popular in the applied literature, is a
“rare” exception where FSE is not obtained. This result was later extended
by McAfee and Reny [28] to the case of continuous type spaces.2
These results, if taken literally, call into the question the robustness of the
standard model with risk neutral agents and independent types. But there are
two issues here. First, it is hard to believe that no surplus is left to any agent.
Second, we need a very sophisticated mechanism for FSE, but we hardly ﬁnd
such a mechanism in real world. Thus there is a sense in which something is
missing from the standard model, which prevents a principal from extracting
full surplus.3 This paper does not address the second (very important) issue
(why are real mechanisms so simple?), but addresses the ﬁrst issue (why may
1This is not true with inﬁnite type spaces. See Heifetz and Neeman [18].
2A recent paper by Kosenok and Severinov [21] proves that FSE is possible even with an
informed principal.
3Crémer and McLean [13] suggests that the common prior assumption may be a cause
for their result.
1agents secure informational rents?).
My ﬁrst main result shows that one possible reason for the failure of FSE is
the endogeneity of type distributions. Notice that the deﬁnition of FSE needs
to be modiﬁed with endogenous type distributions. For FSE, I require not
only that the eﬃcient allocation be implemented, but also that the eﬃcient
action proﬁle be implemented. Then the agents may have incentive to choose
a less eﬃcient action to save cost or manipulate the type distributions to their
advantage. Since the principal needs to take into account these additional
constraints, she is severely constrained when the agents can manipulate their
type distribution in many ways. Thus, intuitively, FSE becomes more diﬃcult
to obtain with more actions. I show exactly how much FSE becomes more
diﬃcult with hidden actions by deriving the necessary and suﬃcient condition
for FSE (Theorem 4) in Section 3. One important implication of the result is
that FSE may not be a generic property when there are many actions compared
to the number of types (Theorem 5).
However, it is also shown that CM’s FSE theorem is far more robust to the
introduction of hidden actions than it appears to be. Only the implementation
of pure action proﬁles is considered until Section 4 because the eﬃcient action
proﬁle is typically unique. In Section 4, I consider the implementation of
almost eﬃcient mixed action proﬁles and show that approximate full surplus
extraction is generically possible. Furthermore, the suﬃcient condition for
approximate FSE is much weaker than the condition for exact full surplus
extraction (Theorem 7). In particular, it is satisﬁed generically for symmetric
models, contrary to the case with exact FSE. (Theorem 8).
To understand this result, it is useful to extend an agent’s type space
from Si (type) to Si×Ai (type × action). Let’s call this latter space player i’s
extended type space. When implementing a pure action proﬁle, it is without loss
of generality to use a mechanism in which the agents announce their types only
(Proposition 1 proves this formally). When mixed actions are played, however,
the agents have additional private information, namely, a realization of their
mixed actions. Thus one is naturally led to a more general mechanism in which
the agents announce their extended types. The almost full surplus extraction
result hinges on the fact that CM’s condition for FSE holds generically for the
extended type space
Q
i Si × Ai. Then, for almost all information structure,
the principal can extract full surplus conditional on every (s,a) given any
completely mixed action proﬁle. This in turn guarantees that the agents indeed
have incentive to play any mixed action proﬁle. Since the eﬃcient action proﬁle
can be approximated arbitrarily closely by a completely mixed action proﬁle,
the principal can implement an almost eﬃcient mixed action proﬁle (Abreu
and Sen [1], Matsushima [26]) and extract the full surplus.
2This paper is hardly the ﬁrst attempt to consider endogenous types in
mechanism design. Probably the most famous class of models with endoge-
nous types would be the model of information acquisition. There are many
papers about information acquisition in a variety of contexts 4 But there are
many other examples. Team production is one example.5. Another exam-
ple is a procurement auction with R&D investment, where the level of R&D
investment at the pre-auction stage determines the distribution of costs.6
Af e wp a p e r so ﬀer an explanation as to why FSE may fail. Heifetz and
Neeman [18], Neeman [32], and Parreiras [35] present a certain kind of type
spaces where FSE cannot be obtained. These papers are discussed in the end
of Section 3. Robert [38] introduces risk aversion/limited liability. Laﬀont
and Martimort [22] introduce collusion proofness as an additional constraint
on the design of mechanisms for public good problems.7
The basic model and some preliminary results are presented in the next
section. In Section 3, I extend CM’s FSE theorem to the case with endogenous
types and show that FSE may not be generic. Section 4 proves the almost full
surplus extraction theorem and shows that it is a generic result.
2 The Model and Some Preliminary Results
2.1 The Model
Consider a principal and n agents. The game proceeds as follows. First
the principal proposes a mechanism to the agents, which consists of message
spaces, an allocation rule, and monetary transfers. Then the agents choose
unobservable actions simultaneously and observe their private types.8 The
distribution of types depends on the agents’ actions. Given their types, the
4See Milgrom [30] and subsequent papers on information acquisition in auction, which
include Bergemann and Välimäki [6], Matthews [27], Persico [35], and Tan [39]. See Crémer
and Khalil [10], Crémer, Khalil and Rochet [12] and Lewis and Sappington [23] for infor-
mation acquision in contracting problems. For recent works on information acquisition and
committe decision, see Cai [8], Gerardi and Yariv [16], Gershkov and Szentes [17], Martinelli
[27], and Persico [36].
5For example, see Sjöström [40].
6See Arozamena and Cantillon [3], Tan [39], and Piccione and Tan [37].
7Che and Kim [10] shows that collusion proofness is not binding with more than two
agents.
8This “action” can be a complex strategy. For example, suppose that an agent takes a
sequence of actions, each of which depends on private information generated by the preced-
ing actions. Then his action corresponds to a complete contingent strategy and his type























agents decide whether to participate in the mechanism or not. For the sake
of simplicity, it is assumed that agents do not observe who participates in the
mechanism.9 If they accept the mechanism, they send a message to the prin-
cipal, and an allocation and monetary transfers are implemented as a function
of messages according to the proposed mechanism. The time line of the game
is shown in Figure 1.10
Let’s introduce formal notations. The set of agents is N = {1,...,n}. Agent
i0s action set and type space is a ﬁnite set Ai and Si respectively. It is assumed
that |Si| ≥ 2 for all i ∈ N. The distribution on S =
Qn
i=1 Si given a ∈ A = Qn
i=1 Ai is given by π : S×A → <+ that satisﬁes
P
s∈S π(s|a)=1for all a ∈ A.
Let Ξ be the space of all such π. At r i p l e(π,S,A) is information structure.
Let πi (si|a)=
P
s−i∈Si π(si,s −i|a) be the marginal distribution on Si given a.
It is assumed that πi (si|a) > 0 for all a ∈ A and si ∈ Si.L e tπi (s−i|si,a)=
π(s|a)
πi(si|a) be agent i0s subjective distribution over the other agents’ types given his













is denoted by πi (si,a). Let X be the set of possible allocations, which is
9This assumption is introduced to avoid oﬀ the equilibrium path where only a strict
subset of the agents participate in the mechanism. None of the results is aﬀected by this
assumption.
10Formally, this is a multistage game with communication (Myerson [31]).
4independent of a or s.
Throughout the paper, I say a certain property is generic if it is satisﬁed
in an open and full measure subset in Ξ. This notion of genericity is stronger
than a weaker notion of genericity that only requires the property to hold in
an open and dense subset of Ξ.
Agent i0sp a y o ﬀ Ui −ti −ci (ai) is agent i’s surplus Ui −ci (ai) minus agent
i’s transfer. Agent i’s surplus consists of two components: utility and cost.
Several classes of utility functions are considered in this paper. The reason is
that, for diﬀerent classes of utility functions, the necessary and suﬃcient for
FSE for an arbitrary proﬁle of utility functions (and cost functions) is diﬀerent
in principle. The most general class of utility functions depend on ﬁnal allo-
cation x ∈ X, type proﬁle s ∈ S, a n da c t i o np r o ﬁle a ∈ A.11 Denote the set of
such utility function proﬁles (U (x,s,a)=( U1 (x,s,a),...Un (x,s,a)))b yUSA.
The set of utility functions like Ui (x,s,ai) is denoted by USa. Ia l s ou s eUsA
and Usa, which are similarly deﬁned.12
Agent i must pay ci (ai) ≥ 0 when he plays ai. I assume that every agent
has an option to do nothing, that is, ∀i,∃ai ∈ Ai such that ci (ai)=0 .13 Let
C be the space of proﬁles of such cost functions.
Mechanism (M,x,t) consists of message spaces M =( M1,...,Mn), allo-
cation function x : M → X, and monetary transfer t : M → <n,w h e r et h e
ith element ti (m) is agent i’s payment to the principal. While agent i’s rent
Ui (x,s,a) − ti matters only when he participates in the mechanism, ci(ai) is
independent of agent i’s participation decision. Thus agent i’s ﬁnal payoﬀ is
−ci (ai) if he didn’t participate in the mechanism. The principal’s payoﬀ is
given by the sum of the resulting proﬁt and transfers: U0 (x,s,a)+
Pn
i=1 ti.
It is assumed that all agents participate in the mechanism in any (almost)
eﬃcient equilibrium.14 The notion of equilibrium for this game is Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
My ﬁrst goal is to understand when the principal can implement the most
11Note that utilities are independent of the agents’ participation decision. Since I assume
that every agent must participate in the mechanism to implement any (almost) eﬃcient
allocation, this assumption is without loss of generality as long as (almost) eﬃcient equilibria
are concerned.
12For pure information acquisition model, s is a proﬁle of purely informative signals about
payoﬀ-relevant hidden parameter θ. If this is the case, E [ui (x,θ)],i =0 ,...,n woudn’t
depend on a or s directly. Then the suﬃcient condition for FSE in this paper is valid, but
the necessary condition is not. Finding the exact necessary and suﬃcient condition for FSE
in this case is left for futture research.
13Reservation values are normalized to 0.
14This assumption is usually satisﬁed in many applications (auction etc.) and my results
can be easily reformulated even when it is not.
5eﬃcient action proﬁle and extract the full surplus from the agents. Thus
ﬁrst I focus on the implementation of pure action proﬁles. In Section 4, the
implementation of almost eﬃcien mixed action proﬁles is considered.
2.2 Revelation Principle and FSE implementability
The above mechanism can be simpliﬁed in two respects. First, it is without loss
of generality to use a direct mechanism, where each agent directly reports his
private information (Mi = Si ×Ai). This follows from the standard revelation
principle argument. Second, the agents do not need to disclose all private
information. It is without loss of generality that the agents disclose only their
types (not actions) to implement any pure action proﬁle.
Proposition 1 When implementing any pure action proﬁl e ,i ti sw i t h o u tl o s s
of generality to set Mi = Si for i ∈ N.
Proof. See the appendix.
Basically this simpler direct mechanism is interpreting any announced ac-
tion proﬁle as the equilibrium action proﬁle in terms of the direct mechanism
with Mi = Si×Ai. Then the agents have a smaller number of deviations under
this simpler direct mechanism with Mi = Si compared to the original direct
mechanism with Mi = Si × Ai. Therefore every pure strategy equilibrium in
the latter mechanism remains an equilibrium in the former mechanism.15
Note that this proposition does not hold when the principal implements
a mixed action proﬁle: the case in which a realized action is truly private
information. In this case, realized actions need to be disclosed for the sake of
eﬃciency because the eﬃcient allocation depends on realized action proﬁles.
Furthermore, such private information may be useful to create more ﬂexible
transfers among the agents. I will come back to this issue in Section 4 when
the implementation of mixed action proﬁl e si sc o n s i d e r e d .
Given Proposition 1, the mechanism design problem reduces to a few sim-
ple inequality constraints. In the following, I use utility functions in USA to
describe these constraints, but the same constraints apply to the other classes
of utility functions. Given any direct mechanism (S,x,t),l e tEUx
i (s0
i,s i,a) be




i,s i,a)=E [Ui (x(s0
i,s −i),s,a)|si,a].T oi m p l e m e n tx and a∗,
15I thank Jacques Crémer for this interpretation.
6t h ef o l l o w i n gc o n s t r a i n t sn e e dt ob es a t i s ﬁed for some t:
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· ti (σi (si)) ,0
¾
− ci (ai).
This means that no agent would gain by deviating to any action other than
a∗
i and/or any announcement/participation strategy. In particular, this con-
straint implies that the following interim IR constraints are satisﬁed on the
equilibrium path,
∀si ∈ Si,∀i ∈ N, EU
x
i (si,s i,a
∗) − πi (si,a
∗) · ti (si) ≥ 0
and the standard truth-telling constraints are satisﬁed on the equilibrium path,
∀si,s
0




∗) − πi (si,a






∗) − πi (si,a
∗) · ti (s
0
i).
When every agent participates in the mechanism and (x,s,a) is realized,




i=1 ci (ai). For any a ∈ A, let












Assume that the optimal allocation exists and denote the maximized social
surplus by W (a). Let A∗ (U,c) be the set of action proﬁles that maximize
W (a) given U ∈ USA and c =( c1,...,cn) ∈ C. An action proﬁle a is FSE-
implementable when a is implementable and the social surplus given a can be
fully extracted.
Deﬁnition 1 Given (U,c), an action proﬁle a ∈ A is FSE-implementable if
there exists a mechanism (S,x,t) and Bayesian Nash equilibrium where a is






ti (s)=W (a) − E [U0 (x
a (s),s,a)|a]
Deﬁnition 2 An information structure (π,S,A) has FSE property for UZ
(Z ∈ {SA,Sa,sA,sa}) if, for any U ∈ UZ and c ∈ C, there exists a ∈ A∗ (U,c)
that is FSE implementable.
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3.1 Example: Auction with Espionage
I start with a simple example to illustrate the main result. Consider the follow-
i n ga u c t i o nw i t ht w ob i d d e r si =1 ,2. Bidder i’s true value vi is either v or v,
v>v> 0, which is not observed before the game starts. The joint distribution
of v =( v1,v 2) is aﬃliated: Pr(v1 = v,v2 = v)=P r( v1 = v,v 2 = v)=λ
2 and
Pr(v1 = v,v2 = v)=P r( v1 = v,v 2 = v)=1−λ
2 for λ > 1
2. The bidders observe
private signals si ∈ Si = {h,l},i=1 ,2. They can choose one of two actions,
N or S before they play the auction. If bidder i chooses N (“no spying”), then
he observes his true value vi (Pr(si = h|vi = v)=P r( si = l|vi = v)=1 ). If
bidder i chooses S (“spying”), which costs c>0 (the cost of N is normal-
ized to 0), then he observes the other bidder’s value vj (Pr(si = h|vj = v)=
Pr(si = l|vj = v)=1 ).16 When bidder i chooses S, he does not learn his
own value. The eﬃcient action proﬁle is always (N,N) because it reveals the
bidders’ true values with no cost. So the question is whether (N,N) can be
implemented and the full surplus can be extracted at the same time.
I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,i ti ss h o w nt h a tF S Ei si m p o s s i b l ew h e n , for example,
v is large.17 The idea is that the principal needs to exploit correlation of the
private signals to extract full surplus from the bidders. In particular, a bidder’s
transfer depends on the other bidder’s announcement. Then each bidder has
incentive to spy on the other bidder to learn the other bidder’s signal.
Note that this is a simple aﬃliated private value auction given (N,N).I fN
is the only available action, then this is exactly the case where FSE is obtained
according to CM’s condition. The point of this example is to show that the
presence of another action may keep a principal from extracting full surplus.
Consider a direct mechanism without loss of generality. For simplicity,
assume that each bidder wins with equal probability when their announced
types are the same. Suppose that the auctioneer is able to extract full surplus






ti (l,sj)πi (sj|l,NN)=0 (1)
16Fang and Morris [14] analyze two bidder private value auctions in which each bidder
observes his own value as well as a noisy signal of the other bidder’s value.
17FSE is also impossible when c>0 is small enough.

















Note that left hand side of this truth-telling constraint is the high type’s
interim rent, thus it must be 0.N o wl e tv go to ∞. Then (2) imply that the
high type’s expected payment
P
sj ti (l,sj)π(sj|h,NN) from lying converges
to ∞. It is not diﬃcult to see from (1) that this can be only accomplished
by letting ti (l,l) →− ∞and ti (l,h) →∞ , that is, by rewarding “positive”
correlation and punishing “negative” correlation of announcements. Then,
when v is large, bidder i has a proﬁtable deviation: play S, announce l if si
is l and stay out of the mechanism if si is h. The problem is that a unilateral
deviation from N to S makes the bidders’ private signals even more correlated
than in equilibrium.
Hence the following result is obtained.
Proposition 2 Fix parameters v > 0 and λ > 1
2. Then there exists e v>v
such that (N,N) is not FSE implementable if v ≥ e v.
3.2 The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden
Actions
If there is no action, or equivalently, the action set is a singleton for every agent,
then this problem reduces to the standard full surplus extraction problem
studied by CM. So it may be useful to state their theorem in the current
framework. Let’s use πi (si), (π,S) and Us instead of πi (si,a), (π,S,A) and
USA a st h e r ei sn oa c t i o n .D e n o t eac o n v e xh u l lo fm vectors xi,i=1 ,...,m
in <n by co{xi : i =1 ,2,...,m}. Then CM’s theorem can be stated in the
following form.
Theorem 3 (Crémer and McLean [13]) An information structure (π,S) has
FSE property in Us if and only if πi (si) / ∈ co{πi (s0
i):s0
i ∈ Si/{si}} for all
si ∈ Si and i ∈ N.
This full surplus extraction theorem can be generalized to the current set-
ting with hidden actions. It turns out that the following analogue of CM’s
9condition is the right extension:








i) 6=( si,a i)} (GCM)
for all si ∈ Si,i ∈ N and a ∈ A
Like CM’s condition, this generalized CM condition (GCM) means that each
conditional distribution is not a positive linear combination of the other condi-
tional distributions. The diﬀerence is that the pool of conditional distributions
is much larger than before. It takes into account all the conditional distribu-
tions given not only realized types but also unilateral deviations in action.
It is easy to verify that GCM is violated in the auction example. Con-
ditional distribution π1 (s1,(N,N)) is a linear combination of π1 (l,(S,N)) =
(0,1) and π1 (h,(S,N)) = (1,0).
Given any a∗ ∈ A, GCM guarantees the existence of transfer t that satisfy
the following condition for any (s0
i,a 0
i) 6=( si,a ∗
i):
πi (si,a











This means that agent i m u s tp a ym o r eb yp l a y i n ga0
i and pretending to be si
given s0
i than si would pay in equilibrium. All deviations (with respect to ac-
tions and/or announcements) can be deterred by setting ti (si) large enough (by
multiplying it if necessary). Mathematically, ti (si) is a normal vector of a hy-













i) 6=( si,a i)
ª
.
Condition GCM is equivalent to the existence of such hyperplane for every
a∗ ∈ A.
In the appendix, it is proved that condition GCM is suﬃcient for FSE with
respect to USA. This automatically implies that GCM is suﬃcient for FSE for
USa,UsA and Usa
It can be shown that GCM is also necessary for FSE, but with one caveat.
W h a tIn e e dt od oi st oﬁnd a particular type of utility functions for which
FSE is not obtained when GCM is violated. To this end, agent i’s utility
conditional on h was modiﬁed in the auction example. To prove necessity for
the general case, I use a similar trick: modify agent i’s utility conditional on
some si or some action ai. The problem is that, in general, this may aﬀect
the eﬃcient action proﬁle. The auction example is set up so that the eﬃcient
action proﬁle is always (N,N). But this property may not be satisﬁed for the
general case. However, when agent i’s utility depends on ai, it is possible to
modify utility functions while keeping the same eﬃcient action proﬁle.18 Thus
condition GCM is necessary for FSE for a class of utility functions such as
USA,U Sa,U sA, and Usa.
18In fact, it suﬃces to assume that Uj depends on ai for some j ∈ N ∪{0} for every i ∈ N.
10Combining this necessity result with the suﬃciency result, the following
theorem is obtained.
Theorem 4 An information structure (π,S,A) has FSE property in USA,
USa,UsA and Usa if and only if it satisﬁes GCM.
Proof. See Appendix.
As already mentioned, CM’s theorem corresponds to the special case where
no action is available to any player.
3.3 Genericity of FSE Property
How strong is GCM? Since there are |Si|·|Ai| diﬀerent conditional distributions
with hidden actions and since each conditional distribution is |S−i|−dimensional
vector, the conditional distribution vectors are independent (henceforth sat-
isfy GCM) generically when |Si|·| Ai| ≤ |S−i|. On the other hand, when
|Si|·| Ai| > |S−i|, it is possible to construct a robust example where GCM
is violated. This implies that FSE is not obtained generically when there are
many actions, i.e. when the agents can manipulate the type distribution in
many ways. For example, consider a symmetric model where |Si| = m and
|Ai| = K for all i. Then the above weak inequality is satisﬁed if and only
if K ≤ mn−2. When the number of the agents is two, it is violated as soon
as each agent can take two diﬀerent actions as in the auction example. The
following result follows from the proof of Theorem 8.19
Theorem 5 FSE property is generic in Ξ if and only if |Si|·| Ai| ≤ |S−i| for
all i ∈ N.
When |Ai| =1(the case of CM) , this condition reduces to |Si| ≤ |S−i|.
Thus it is always satisﬁed generically for symmetric models. On the other
hand, the above result shows that GCM may not be generically satisﬁed even
for symmetric models if the number of actions is much larger than the number
of private types.
19“Only if” does not follow from Theorem 8. But, when GCM is violated, it is easy to
construct an example where FSE fails.
113.4 Discussion
On Assumption of Commitment
It is important for the above results that a mechanism is proposed before
the agents act, that is, the principal commits not to change the mechanism
once actions are taken. An alternative assumption would be to allow the
principal to propose a mechanism after actions are taken. Which model is
more appropriate depends on the nature of problems at hand. For example, the
former assumption may be more natural if the principal is uncertain about the
timing of actions. It would be also natural if the principal designs a mechanism
which will be played repeatedly (repeated auctions etc.) because the strategic
complexity of such dynamic games is signiﬁcantly reduced with commitment.
Both assumptions have been employed in the literature. For example, Crémer
and Khalil [10], Crémer, Khalil and Rochet[11], and Lewis and Sappington
[23] use the former assumption, whereas Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet [12] use
the latter assumption.
The previous analysis suggests that a principal has a strong incentive to
commit to a mechanism in the beginning of the game. Suppose that the princi-
pal cannot commit. Given that a pure action proﬁle is implemented, since the
principal knows the action proﬁle in equilibrium before she proposes a mecha-
nism, she can extract all the expected utility (not the surplus) of the agents as
long as CM’s condition (which is typically generic) is satisﬁed given the equi-
librium action proﬁl e .H e n c et h ea g e n t sa r en o tc o m p e n s a t e df o rt h e i r( s u n k )
cost. This means that the only cheapst action proﬁle is implementable with-
out commitment. This is not desirable for a principal for two reasons. First,
t h em o s te ﬃcent action proﬁle may not be implemented without commitment,
thus the total size of the pie, from which the principal extracts surplus, may
not be maximized. Second, the principal may simply make less money without
commitment. In the auction example, the only implementable pure action pro-
ﬁle is (N,N) without commitment. Although (N,N) is eﬃcient, the principal
may not extract the full surplus. However, it is proved in the next section that
(N,N) is approximately FSE implementable (using a mixed strategy proﬁle
converging to (N,N)) with commitment.20 See the next section for details.
Interim and Ex Ante IR Constraint
Suppose that the agents sign a contract before taking any action and cannot
run away without the principal’s consent. That is, the agents are subject to
20It may be possible to implement some mixed action proﬁle without commitment. But
it can be shown that even approximate FSE is not obtained in this case.
12ex ante IR constraints rather than interim IR constraints. In this case, it is
signiﬁcantly easier for a principal to extract full surplus. Since the principal
can use “entrance fee”, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for FSE reduces
to a much weaker condition, namely, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
the eﬃcient (Bayesian) implementation. For example, a condition similar to
Assumption 1 (ii) in Aoyagi [2] would suﬃce for FSE.21
Universal Type Space
Some papers study FSE in more general type spaces. Neeman [32] shows
that FSE fails when some agent can be two diﬀerent types with diﬀerent
values who share the same belief about the other agents’ types. This type of
information structure is not generic when each agent’s type space is a ﬁnite set
of payoﬀ-relevant types. However, if one consider universal type spaces (à la
Mertens and Zamir [29]), the “naive” type space that is generated from such
space with a common prior is very special. Thus FSE may be “more likely”
to fail in the space of more general type spaces. In fact Heifetz and Neeman
[18] show that the set of priors on a universal type space which allows FSE is
“small” in a certain sense.22 My results are complementary to theirs because
they show that FSE can fail even in a naive type space.
FSE and Information Acquisition
Parreiras [35] is closely related to this paper. In his model, each agent
d r a w st w ot y p e so fp r i v a t ei n f o r m a t i o n(ti,θi) ∈ Ti × Θi, where ti is a payoﬀ
relevant type and θi is a parameter which reﬂects the informativeness of ti





i such that i’s conditional distribution on T−i given (ti,θ
0
i) is more
informative than i’s conditional distribution on T−i given (ti,θ
00
i) in the sense
of Blackwell. This information parameter θi is playing the same role as actions
in this paper. This paper extends Parreira’s analysis by endogenizing θi as a
degree of information acquisition and proving that FSE may not be a generic
property.
21His condition needs to be modiﬁed to allow conditional distributions that depend on
actions. But otherwise it is straightforward to apply his result here.
22For another attempt to introduce more general type spaces to mechanism design prob-
lems, see Bergemann and Morris [5].
134 Curse of Full Surplus Extraction Theorem
In this section, FSE is replaced with a weaker notion: approximate FSE. Since
mixed action proﬁles are used to establish approximate FSE, Proposition 1
does not apply. Thus I use the direct mechanism where the agents report both
realized actions and their types. The notion of FSE-implementability can be
extended to mixed action proﬁl e sa sf o l l o w s .
Deﬁnition 3 Given (U,C), a mixed action proﬁle α ∈
Qn
i=1 4(Ai) is FSE-
implementable if there exists a mechanism (S × A,x,t) and a perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium where α is played and the full surplus is extracted from the






ti (s,a)=W (a) − E [U0 (x
a (s,a),s,a)|a] for any a ∈ suppα
where suppαis the support of α ∈
Qn
i=1 4Ai.
Deﬁnition 4 An information structure (π,S,A) has approximate FSE prop-
erty for UZ (Z = SA,Sa etc.) if, for any ε > 0,U∈ UZ and c ∈ C, there
exists α ∈
Qn
i=1 4(Ai) which is FSE implementable and satisﬁes
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
W (a
∗) − E [U0 (x





#¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
< ε
for some a∗ ∈ A∗ (U,c) for some mechanism (S × A,x,t).
Let’s call a realized type-action pair (si,a i) player ´ ı’s extended type.T h e
crucial insight is that a set of conditional distributions in the space of extended
types satisﬁes CM’s necessary and suﬃcient condition much more easily given
any completely mixed action.T h u se v e r ya l m o s te ﬃcient mixed action proﬁle
can be FSE-implementable even when the most eﬃcient action is not FSE-
implementable. When CM’s condition holds in the extended type space given
any completely mixed action proﬁle, the principal can extract the full surplus
from each extended type of every agent. In particular, any cost associated
with actions can be exactly reimbursed by the mechanism at the end of the
game. This in turn provides the incentive for the agents to randomize in the
beginning of the game.
144.1 Approximate FSE
To understand how useful the extended type space is, the following simple
example might be useful. Suppose that there are two agents with S1 =
{x1,x 2,x 3} and S2 = {y1,y 2}. There is no action for agent 1, and A2 =
{a0,a 00}. Suppose that agent 1’s conditional belief on agent 2’s extended type
space S2 × A2 is given by the following matrix.
(y1,a 0) (y2,a 0) (y1,a 00) (y2,a 00)
x1 α · 3
4 α · 1










x2 α · 1
2 α · 1








x3 α · 1
4 α · 3








where α is the probability that agent 2 plays a0.
In this example, if agent 2 plays a0 with probability 1 (α =1 ), then the
second row becomes a linear combination of the other two. Thus CM’s con-
dition is violated. Similarly, if agent 2 plays a00 with probability 1 (α =0 ),
the second row is still a positive linear combination of the ﬁrst and the third.
Notice, however, that the weight for each row is slightly diﬀerent across these
two linear combinations because of ε,ε0,ε00 > 0. This implies that the second
row is not a linear combination of others if agent 2 uses any genuine mixed
action proﬁle (α ∈ (0,1)). Therefore this conditional distribution matrix sat-
isﬁes CM’s necessary and suﬃcient condition (for agent 1) if and only if agent
2 mixes his actions.23
Let’s deﬁne CM’s condition on the extend type space more formally. For
any given completely mixed strategy α−i by other players than agent i, let
πi (si,a i,α−i) ∈ <|S−i×A−i| be agent i’s belief about the other agents’ extended
types (s−i,a −i) ∈ S−i × A−i conditional on agent i’s extended type (si,a i) ∈
Si × Ai.
Condition 1 (ECM) Given a completely mixed action proﬁle α ∈
Q
i∈N 4o (Ai),
an information structure (π,S,A) satisﬁes Extended Crémer-McLean condi-
tion (ECM) if








i) 6=( si,a i)}
for any i ∈ N and any (si,a i) ∈ Si × Ai
T h ea b o v ee x a m p l em o t i v a t e st h ef o l l o w i n gModiﬁed Crémer-McLean con-
dition (MCM).
23Indeed this matrix is full row rank for almost all ε,ε0,ε00, which is a stronger condition
than CM’s condition.
15Condition 2 (MCM) For any i ∈ N and any (si,a i) ∈ Si ×Ai,t h e r ee x i s t s
a−i ∈ A−i such that








i) 6=( si,a i)}
It is not diﬃcult to show that MCM implies ECM for any completely mixed
strategy α. Being independent of the choice of α, MCM is easier to check than
ECM. Note that MCM reduces to GCM if a is ﬁxed. Since a−i can be varied
for each ai, MCM is weaker than GCM.
The basic idea behind these conditions is that, since a combination of ac-
tions and types has more information than just types, it is useful to condition
continuation strategies on realized actions. This idea is closely related to pri-
vate strategy (Kandori and Obara [20], Mailath, Matthews, and Sekiguchi [24],
Obara [33]), although private strategies in these papers do not use messages.
This type of strategy (with messages) is similar to the strategy which is used by
Kandori [19] to relax Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [15]’s suﬃcient condition
for the folk theorem with imperfect public monitoring. However, Kandori [19]
examines how the rank condition of conditional distributions can be relaxed by
using mixed actions and communication, whereas the above conditions focuses
more on how the convex independence condition of conditional distributions
can be relaxed.
T h ef o l l o w i n gt h e o r e m sa r et h em a i nr e s u l t so ft h i ss e c t i o n .
Theorem 6 Given (U,c), a completely mixed action proﬁle α ∈
Q
i∈N 4o (Ai)
is FSE implementable if (π,S,A) satisﬁes ECM given α.
Theorem 7 An information structure (π,S,A) has an approximate FSE prop-
erty in USA, UsA,USa, and Usa if it satisﬁes MCM.
The proof of the ﬁrst theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 4, thus
omitted. The second theorem follows from the fact that MCM implies ECM
for any α and any eﬃcient action proﬁle a∗ ∈ A can be approximated by
completely mixed action proﬁle.
These results suggest that the presence of hidden actions can be beneﬁcial
to the principal contrary to the result in Section 3. For example, suppose
that the joint type distribution is independent across agents given the eﬃcient
action proﬁle. Then CM’s condition is violated and the surplus cannot be fully
extracted. Theorem 7 implies that, even in such a case, the principal may be
able to extract almost all the surplus by letting the agents play some ineﬃcient
actions with small probability.
As expected, approximate FSE is much easier to obtain as the following
theorem shows.
16Theorem 8 Approximate FSE property is generic in Ξ if |Si||Ai| ≤ |S−i||A−i|
for all i ∈ N.
Proof. See Appendix.
L e tm ep o i n to u tt h a tt h i sc o n d i t i o n( |Ai||Si| ≤ |A−i||S−i|)i sas u ﬃcient
condition for the set of conditional distributions for agent i (πi (s−i,a −i|si,a i,α−i),
(si,a i) ∈ Si × Ai)t ob efull-rank given any completely mixed action proﬁle.24
This is much stronger than ECM being satisﬁed for any completely mixed α.
I conjecture that ECM is satisﬁed practically almost always for almost all α.
Nonetheless, the condition for Theorem 8 is still very weak compared to the
condition for Theorem 5. In particular, Theorem 8 implies that the approxi-
mate FSE property is generically satisﬁed for the symmetric case (|Ai| = |Aj|,
|Si| = |Sj| for all i,j ∈ N) unlike the FSE property.
4.2 Auction with Espionage Continued
Let’s go back to the auction example. Suppose that player i,i =1 ,2 plays N
with probability αi ∈ (0,1) and S with probability 1 − αi. Then, bidder i0s
conditional distributions on bidder j (6= i)’s extended type space Sj ×Aj is as
follows.
(N,h) (N,l) (S,h) (S,l)
(N,h) αjλ αj (1 − λ) 1 − αj 0
(N,l) αj (1 − λ) αjλ 0 1 − αj
(S,h) αj 0 (1 − αj)λ (1 − αj)(1− λ)
(S,l) 0 αj (1 − αj)(1− λ) (1 − αj)λ
This conditional distribution matrix satisﬁes MCM. Thus it is possible to
ﬁnd some monetary transfers which extract all the surplus from the bidders.
This in turn guarantees that they have incentive to randomize.
To be more concrete, let me describe one example of mechanisms that
extract full surplus for each realization of action proﬁle. The bidders announce
both their types and realized actions. The good is allocated eﬃciently and
symmetrically. There will be transfers if and only if the bidders announce
diﬀerent actions, i.e. when one bidder claims that he spied on the other and
the other claims that he did not. Note that this is exactly when private types
are perfectly correlated. This strong correlation can be exploited to provide a
24The full rank condition does not imply MCM, but guarantees ECM for any completely
m i x e da c t i o np r o ﬁle like MCM does.
17proper incentive to both players. If a bidder deviates unilaterally to announce a
false action or a false type, then his announcement may be inconsistent with the
other bidder’s announcement. If these inconsistencies are severely punished,
then no bidder would have incentive to deviate at the communication stage.
Finally transfers can be constructed so that the every bidder’s utility is exactly
extracted, whereas the cost of spying is reimbursed to the bidder who spied.
5 Appendix: Proof of the Theorem
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Proof. This proposition is proved for USA b e c a u s ei ti st h em o s tg e n e r a l
class of utility functions.
The proof consists of two steps. First, clearly it is without loss of gener-
a l i t yt ou s ead i r e c tm e c h a n i s mi.e. Mi = Si × Ai by the revelation principle.
Next, take any such direct mechanism (S × A,x,t) and any Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Let a∗ ∈ A be the equilibrium action proﬁle. Consider the alter-
native mechanism (S,x0,t 0,) deﬁned by x0 (s)=x(s,a∗) and t0 (s)=t(s,a∗).
Then playing a∗ and revealing true private signals is still an equilibrium of this
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P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4
18Proof. (Suﬃciency): This is proved for USA. Let a∗ be any optimal
action proﬁle and x∗ be an optimal allocation. If Condition GCM is satisﬁed,
then there exists t0
i : S → <n to satisfy 0=πi (si,a ∗)·t0









i (si) for every si, (s0
i,a 0
i) 6=( si,a ∗
i) and i ∈ N b yt h eh y p e r p l a n et h e o r e m .













where γ is some large number. Then it is clear that agent i’s surplus is fully
extracted by construction if a∗ is played and the true types are revealed.
Several conditions need to be checked: (1) agent i plays a∗
i, (2) participates
in the mechanism on the equilibrium path and (3) reveals his true type on the
equilibrium path. (3) is satisﬁed if γ is large enough. (2) is clearly satisﬁed
by construction. To see that (1) is satisﬁed, note that agent i’s best response
after a deviation to any other action is not to participate in the mechanism.
Thus agent i’s rent is at most 0 after any such deviation. This proves that a∗
can be implemented while the principal extracts the full surplus.
(Necessity): This is proved for Usa. Suppose that Condition CM is vio-
lated for some s∗
i and a∗. Then there exists (si,k,a i,k)(6=( s∗
i,a ∗
i)) and αk > 0,










. Id e r i v ea
contradiction by assuming that the principal can extract full surplus for any
(U,c).
Let (U0,c) be any proﬁle of utility functions and cost functions such that





=0for i ∈ N,a n d( 3 )U0
j (x,sj,a j)=0for j 6= i
and U0
i (x,si,a i) > 0 for all (x,si,a i). By (3), the most eﬃcient allocation is




















































i (x,si,a i) otherwise.
where η0,η00 > 0. For each η0 > 0, η00 needs to be taken large enough so that a∗
i ss t i l lt h eo p t i m a la c t i o np r o ﬁle. Note also that this change of utility functions
does not aﬀect the optimal allocation xa∗.
Let (S,x∗,t ∗) be an optimal direct mechanism which implements a∗ and
extracts the full surplus with these new utility functions. Consider the fol-
lowing unilateral deviation by agent i for k =1 ,...,K:p l a y ai,k, announce
19s∗
i when si,k is observed and stay out otherwise. Agent i0spayoﬀ from such a
deviation must be less than or equal to agent i’s equilibrium payoﬀ 0. Thus













































































































































































































































































i,a ∗) · t∗
i (s∗






























20Note that this expression is independent of the choice of transfers and must
be satisﬁed for any η0 > 0. This is a contradiction.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m8










































Suppose that |Si||Ai| ≤ |S−i||A−i| and consider a |Si||Ai|×| S−i||A−i|
matrix where each (si,a i) × (s−i,a −i) entry is given by π(s|a). Is h o wt h a t
this matrix is full-row rank for an open full measure subset of Ξ. This proves
the theorem because the matrix of conditional distributions given any com-
pletely mixed action proﬁle is full-row rank (hence ECM is satisﬁed) if this
matrix is full row rank. To see this, pick any completely mixed action proﬁle
α and consider |Si||Ai|×| S−i||A−i| matrix where each (si,a i) row is given
by πi (si,a i,α−i). If the (si,a i) - row is multiplied by πi (si|ai,α−i) and the
columns corresponding to a−i is divided by α−i (a−i), then this matrix be-
comes the above matrix. Hence the rank of these two matrices are the same
for any completely mixed action proﬁle α.
The proof is based on an induction argument. It is clear that each 1 × 1
submatrix (cell) is full-rank (6=0 ) for an open full measure subset of Ξ. It is
also clear that entries in any pair of two cells are not the same for an open
full measure subset of Ξ. Let Ξ1 be the subset of Ξ where these two conditions
are met. Since a ﬁnite intersection of open full measure sets is still open and
full measure, Ξ1 is open and full measure in Ξ. Suppose that Ξn is a subset
of Ξ where (1) every n×n submatrix is full rank and (2) the determinants of
two n × n submatrices is not the same in absolute value for any pair of two
n × n submatrices that do not share exactly the same set of parameters (this
is consistent with the deﬁnition of Ξ1 because |Si| ≥ 2,i∈ N). Let Ξn+1 be
the subset of Ξn,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes (1) and (2) with respect to (n +1 )× (n +1 )
submatrices. In the following, I show that, if Ξn is an open and full measure set
in Ξ, then Ξn+1 is an open and full measure set in Ξ. Then, by induction, every
|Si||Ai|× |Si||Ai| submatrix is full rank, therefore the |Si||Ai|×| S−i||A−i|
matrix is full-row rank generically.
Suppose that Ξn is an open and full measure set in Ξ. Fix any (n +1 )×
(n +1 )submatrix X(n+1).L e tΞ0 ⊂ Ξ be the set of parameter vectors for which
21X(n+1) is singular. I show that Ξ0 is closed and has measure 0. Closedness fol-
lows immediately from the continuity of the determinant. Let e Ξ be a compact
set in Ξn. Since Lebesgue measure is regular, Ξn can be approximated by e Ξ
from the inside, i.e. the measure of Ξn/e Ξ can be made arbitrarily small. Let ¯ ¯X(n+1)¯ ¯ be the determinant of X(n+1). Remember that the determinant of an














hj is the n × n matrix that is obtained by deleting the hth row and
the jth column from X(n+1) and xij is hj-entry of X(n+1). A similar expression
can be obtained for each column. Pick any parameter vector in Ξ0 ∩ e Ξ.T h e n ¯ ¯X(n+1)¯ ¯ =0at that vector by deﬁnition. I show that a derivative of this
determinant with respect to some parameter is nonzero. There are two cases.
First, suppose that there is a parameter, call it xhj, that appears only once
in X(n+1). Take a derivative of





¯ ¯ ¯, which is not 0 by deﬁnition of Ξn (by (1)). Second,





is an element of X(n+1). Take a derivative of
¯ ¯X(n+1)¯ ¯ with














It can be shown that these two n × n matrices do not share exactly the same
set of parameters (|Si| ≥ 2,i∈ N is used here). Hence it is not 0 by deﬁnition
of Ξn (by (2)). In either case, this derivative is not 0. Then by the implicit
function theorem, I can ﬁnd a neighborhood of the parameter vector in which
Ξ0 is a lower dimensional object. Since Ξ0 is closed, Ξ0 ∩ e Ξ is compact. By
compactness, Ξ0∩e Ξ is then a ﬁnite union of such lower-dimensional objects in
Ξ, thus is a 0 measure set. As e Ξ can be arbitrarily close to a full measure set
Ξn, Ξ0 is a 0 measure set.
Next ﬁxa n yt w od i s t i n c t(n +1 )× (n +1 )submatrices that do not share
the exactly same set of parameters. Let Ξ00 ⊂ Ξ be the set of parameter vectors
for which these two submatrices has determinants which are the same in their
absolute value. As before, I can show that Ξ00 is closed and has measure 0
(even simpler this time). Closedness is obvious. Pick any parameter vector in
Ξ00 ∩ e Ξ. Take the derivative of the diﬀerence of absolute values with respect
22to the parameter which appears in only one of the two matrices. Then the
derivative is just a (±) determinant of some n × n matrix, which is not 0 by
deﬁnition of Ξn. Then it can be shown that Ξ00 is closed and has 0 measure in
exactly the same way as before.
I can repeat this for every (n +1 )× (n +1 )matrix and any pair of two
(n +1 )×(n +1 )matrices that do not share exactly the same set of parameters.
Take a ﬁnite union of all Ξ0 and Ξ00. This ﬁnite union is still closed and measure
0, thus its complement is an open and full measure set in Ξ.S i n c eΞn+1 is the
intersection of this complement and Ξn, it is an open full measure set in Ξ.
Finally, I can repeat this procedure with respect to every player. Since the
number of players is ﬁnite, the |Si||Ai|×|S−i||A−i| matrix is full-row rank for
every i ∈ N in an open and full measure set in Ξ.
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